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The major economic activity for pastoralists is animal husbandry. The harsh 
environment in which herders raise their livestock requires constant mobility to 
regulate resource utilization via a common property regime. In contrast to the 
mobile way of life characterizing pastoralism, agriculture as a sedentary activity is 
only marginally present in the lowlands of the Afar regional state in Ethiopia. 
Nevertheless, this study reveals a situation where the traditional land–use 
arrangements in Afar are being transformed due to the introduction of farming. In 
the past, the Imperial and the Socialist governments introduced large–scale 
agriculture in a coercive manner, thereby instigating massive resistance from the 
pastoralists. Currently, the recurrence of drought in the study areas has facilitated 
the subdivision of the communal land on a voluntary basis for the purpose of 
farming. Qualitative and quantitative analysis highlight the drivers, both coercive 
and non–coercive, of the transformation of traditional property rights of Afar 
pastoralists.  
Keywords: traditional property rights, pastoralists, introduction of farming, 
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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFAR COMMONS IN 
ETHIOPIA 
State Coercion, Diversification, and Property Rights Change among 
Pastoralists 
Bekele Hundie and Martina Padmanabhan
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Change in natural environmental conditions has constantly influenced pastoral 
livelihoods in the Afar region of Ethiopia, though uncertainty in ecological conditions 
and insecurity of property rights has increased only relatively recently (Scoones, 
1995, McCarthy et al., 1999). As a result of these changes, the reliable flow of life–
sustaining goods and services previously wrought from the area's erratic rangeland 
ecosystems is diminishing, putting pastoral livelihoods at great risk (Gadamu, 
1994). The adaptation of these pastoralists is not confined to a simple human–land 
relationship in an isolated setting, but is rather influenced by demographic change, 
agricultural expansion, attempts to incorporate them into the national economy, 
and insecurity arising from conflicts and border instability (Davies and Bennett, 
2007). Due to the widespread nature of droughts (Berkele, 2002) and ethnic 
conflicts (Hagmann, 2005) in several areas of Ethiopia, livestock mobility between 
alternative water and grazing areas has also been severely constrained 
(Padmanabhan, forthcoming), weakening livestock and causing a significant 
increase in livestock mortality. The cumulative effect of these factors has led to the 
weakening of traditional authority, degradation of natural resources, and growing 
vulnerability of different pastoral groups to ecological and economic stress, often 
resulting in poverty (Unruh, 2005; Rettberg, 2006). 
In this situation, livestock herders increasingly pursue non–pastoral income 
strategies to meet consumption needs and prepare against shocks such as drought 
(Little et al., 2001). Property right changes having to do with the evolving 
relationship between pastoralists and agriculture are at the center of this analysis, 
which looks into two cases related to agricultural production systems and Afar 
pastoralists. One case portrays the conflictive transformation of the traditional land 
use arrangements of Afar pastoralists, which came about due to the coercive 
intervention of the state in implementing projects associated with commercial 
farming, while the other shows the more or less collective adaptation to farming, as 
induced by recurrent droughts in the presence of small–scale and supportive state 
intervention. Indeed, the two cases show that pastoralism is under pressure arising 
from both policy–related and natural challenges.  
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Ethiopia’s national poverty reduction program recognizes that there is a 
rising threat to pastoral livelihoods as a result of biased policies and environmental 
change. The changes in economic policy that came about following political changes 
in 1991 gave development priority to neglected regions and groups, like pastoral 
and agro–pastoral group in the lowlands. Consequently, the present constitution 
recognizes pastoral land as specified in Article 40 and shows the step–wise 
constitutional and legal recognition of a common property regime for rangeland 
resources. Nevertheless, the government is still facilitating the gradual conversion 
of pastoralists into more sedentary livelihoods, reflected in the majority of its 
strategies for change (UN OCHA–PCI, 2007). 
Historically, Ethiopian pastoralists have been the most marginalized groups in 
the policy arena (Helland, 2002; Yemane, 2003). During the Imperial regime (1930 
to 1974), pastoralists were considered to be aimless wanderers who led a primitive 
way of life (Abdulahi, 2004; Getachew, 2001); moreover, they were considered to 
have been using natural resources wastefully (Gebre, 2001). Hence, during this 
time the main ambition of government officials, who were entirely from peasant or 
urban backgrounds, was to convert these ‘primitive’ societies into sedentary 
farmers who would utilize resources more efficiently. Different government policies 
emphasized that efficient resource utilization was possible if the vast and 
‘inefficiently used’ resources in pastoral areas came under the control of the state, 
legitimizing government intervention (ibid).  
This modernist discourse, viewing pastoralism as a stage for gradual 
development towards agro–pastoralism and finally sedentary agriculture, had been 
the basis for most policy formulation under the socialist regime (1974 to 1991) until 
the nineties, and still causes great grievance and irritation in the public policy 
debates on pastoralists today. Chatty (2007) stresses the simultaneity of 
pastoralists’ cultural persistence and resistance to sedentarization and farming, 
while also compromising and adjusting to modernization efforts and a globalizing 
world. Modernist thinking, characterized by a linear development path, has 
influenced the pastoral situation in the past through forced diversification, while 
today we observe voluntary farming activities. 
On the one hand, with its increasing involvement in land–use politics since 
the 1960s, the state as a powerful external force has inflicted severe changes upon 
the property right regimes that govern pastoralist life. The influence of the state–
farms established in the Awash valley on dry–season pastures has forced the 
institutional arrangements of the commons into diversification. On the other hand, 
the current endeavors of development intervention to promote farming are opening 
up other opportunities.  
In this chapter, we discuss two cases of pastoralist involvement in agriculture 
and investigate the challenges and opportunities of this transition. We focus on the 
drivers of crop production from a dual perspective: first, as an outcome of state 
coercion and, second, as a voluntary response to natural calamities. One case 
portrays the conflictive transformation of the traditional land use arrangements of 
Afar pastoralists, which came about due to the coercive intervention of the state in 
implementing projects associated with commercial farming, while the other shows 
the more or less collective action to adapt farming, as induced by recurrent 
droughts in the presence of small–scale and supportive state intervention. Property 
right changes are at the center of this analysis of diversification. As we will  
 
6 
demonstrate, there is considerable difference within pastoral communities in 
motivations for diversification, predominantly along lines of wealth and gender. In 
addition, the question of whether this recent option of small–scale farming is taken 
up by pastoralists depends on factors such as per capita livestock assets, suitability 
of the land for farming in general, access to wage employment as an alternative 
income source, and external support in regards to farming activities. The 
contradictory impact of these processes on property rights and collective action 
regarding poverty is also to be discussed. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly 
discusses the theory of transformation of property rights; the next section places 
the study at hand in the wider theoretical debate on property right changes. Section 
3 describes the study sites and methods; Section 4 describes the current 
institutional arrangements of Afar pastoralists; Sections 5 and 6 discuss the 
transformation of the traditional land use arrangements of Afar due to coercive 
state intervention and natural challenges, respectively. The final section 
summarizes the main findings and provides policy suggestions.  
2.  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY RIGHT CHANGES, 
DIVERSIFICATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The notion of property rights refers to a “bundle” of rights that individuals or groups 
have on a certain material or intellectual resource (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Bromley (1991) defines these bundles of rights as 
including the right to derive benefits from the resource, the right to exclude others, 
the right to manage the resource, and the right to transfer the resource to others 
through various arrangements, backed up and enforced by the collective. Rights 
may be time–bounded or intermittent. Right holders are claimants over a resource 
− including individuals, communities, or legal entities − who may enjoy all rights in 
a bundle or be limited to only some of them. In most cases, conflicts take place 
among different individuals or communities regarding who should have command 
over a resource, how to use it, when to use it, and so on (Mwangi, 2005). There are 
a great number of cases in which different people or communities bear overlapping 
claims over resources, such as in the case of the riverine pastures of Afar. In 
pastoral areas, grazing land is a common–pool resource to which a great number of 
herders have de facto rights (Kirk, 1999; Swallow and Bromley, 1995). For a 
detailed discussion of the linkage between land rights and access to water, see 
Beyene and Korf (2008). 
While rights imply the access of right holders to benefit streams, they do not 
guarantee the realization of benefits. All members of a clan in Afar hold rights to 
the common rangeland that belongs to their clan, but have different capabilities to 
utilize it. Households with little livestock have less means with which to actually 
access the resources. Ribot and Peluso sharpen this distinction by providing a 
broader framework for property right analysis. The basic idea underlying their 
framework is the distinction between property and access. Accordingly, ‘access is 
about all possible means by which a person is able to benefit from things’, while 
‘property generally evokes some kind of socially acknowledged and supported 
claims or rights’ (2003:155). With this re–conceptualization, they show how  
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capability differences arising from access to different resources influence the 
quantity and quality of benefits that can be generated from them. 
Studies in diversification strategies (such as Holtzman, 1996; Kituyi, 1990; 
Little, 1992; Zaal and Dietz, 1999) show that distinct change and diversification is 
still discussed as a two–sided coin, which may either allow herders to better cope 
with high levels of risk or may exaggerate their problems. Cultivation is a major 
avenue of diversification and is seen by some as a viable risk management strategy 
(Campbell, 1984; Smith, 1998), while others view it as an unsustainable or even 
destructive option that accentuates the risks pastoralists face (Hogg, 1988; Little et 
al., 2007). Fratkin (1991) and Nathan et al. (1996) show the potentially negative 
ecological and social effects of pastoral sedentarization and diversification. Yet, for 
Holtzmann (1996), diversification is seen as a cyclical rather than a linear process, 
whereby herders combine different income strategies at different points in their 
life–cycle. Equally, income diversification strategies such as farming among 
pastoralists do not necessarily lead to a diminished interest in livestock investments 
and production (Little et al., 2001).  
One driving factor of property rights changes is diversification through the 
adoption of non–pastoral livelihood strategies. Berhanu et al. (2007) describes for 
the Borana pastoralists in southern Ethiopia the importance of human capital 
investment and related support services for improving the pastoralist capacity to 
manage risk through a diversified income portfolio. The increasing privatization of 
rangelands for crop production and private grazing along this diversification is 
explained by Kamara et al. (2004): certain national policies have resulted in 
conflicts of authority between traditional and formal systems, creating an avenue 
for spontaneous enclosures, associated conflicts and decreasing human welfare. 
Lesorogol (2005) finds that in Kenya households’ gains from privatization depend 
on the particular ways of how the process of land tenure change and the pattern of 
diversification were integrated into the pastoral livelihood. In this case local level 
norms reinforced the value of land ownership for residents, thus preserving the 
pastoral way of life. 
Collective action is a central feature structuring the utilization of rangelands 
by herders. In this paper, two different applications of collective action are 
examined. On the one hand, collective ownership and differentiated use patterns in 
herd management are the precondition for pastoralist’s existence in marginal 
environment. On the other hand, the mobile people react to changes in property 
rights by venturing into crop production as a mean of livelihood diversification. If 
collective action is the voluntary action taken by a group to achieve a common 
interest (Meinzen–Dick and Di Gregorio, 2004), herding as well as commonly 
adopted agriculture are aiming at improving the welfare of the members. Collective 
action and cooperation may also exist at various levels within an institutional 
framework (Schmid, 2004; Ostrom, 1990) for purposes such as defense and attack 
or peaceful exchanges (Hundie, 2008). Institutions create stable expectations 
among people (Knight, 1992), and, hence, well–functioning institutions facilitate 
cooperation (Schmid, 2004). In some societies, the rules that govern human 
behavior are more formalized than in others. In such cases, institutions are built 
intentionally to reduce the incentives for non–cooperation vis–à–vis cooperation 
(Olson, 1965). In other societies, informal social relationships and the institutions 
embedded in those relationships shape behavior and the decisions of actors to  
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cooperate or not (Grant, 2001). State coercion and diversification into agriculture 
are met with collective strategies and result in the transformation of the commons 
in Afar. 
3.  STUDY SITES AND METHODS 
The Afar region extends from central to northeastern Ethiopia, following the East 
African Rift Valley. The study districts – namely Amibara, Awash–Fentale and 
Semu–Robi–Gele’alo – are found in the southern part of the Afar region (Figure 1). 
Amibara and Awash–Fentale are located in the middle Awash valley, within the Rift 
Valley, whereas Semu–Robi is found across the lowland–highland interface, towards 
the western border of the Rift Valley. All study areas are characterized by a semi–
arid climate, with average annual temperatures ranging from 21 to 38 °C, the 
lowest temperatures being between December and February, and the highest 
between April and June. The average annual rainfall is about 697 mm, coming 
primarily in two rainy seasons, namely karma (July to September) and gilel (March 
to April).  
 




Source: Afar Region Administration (2005)  
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The dominant source of livelihoods in the study areas is pastoralism, with 
limited levels of crop cultivation and other activities (Table 1). Afar pastoralists 
raise mixed species of primary livestock, including camels and cattle, and keep 
supplementary herds of goats and sheep, usually for commercial purposes. They 
manage their livestock under an extensive mobile system, with natural pasturage 
being the main source of livestock feed. 
 
Table 1: Background of the three study sites 
Location  Amibara   Awash Fentale   Semu Robi  




Ethnic and clan groups  Afar clans: Sidhabura, 
Rakbadermella 
Non–Afars: Amhara, 




Afar clan: Sidhabura 
Kebeles studied  Ambash, Qurqura  Doho, Dudub  Harihamo, Daleti 
No. of households 
interviewed 
60 60 60 
Location  Southern part of Afar 
region (in the middle 
Awash valley) 
Southern part of Afar 
region (in the middle 
Awash valley) 
Southwest part of Afar 




To investigate both historical and recent changes in the traditional property 
rights of Afar pastoralists, we pursued primary and secondary data sources and 
employed various procedures for data collection. Section five is based mainly on 
secondary data, including several unpublished documents accessed from the Middle 
Awash Agricultural Development Enterprise (MAADE), the Melka Werer Agricultural 
Research Center, and the Afar Region Administration. The information obtained 
from these and other documents was augmented with data generated through key 
informant interviews and discussions with groups of pastoralists.  
Section 6 is based mainly on the data collected from 180 pastoral households 
dwelling in six purposively selected sites namely: Ambash and Qurqura in Amibara 
district, Doho and Dudub in Awash–Fentale district, and Harihamo and Daleti in 
Semu–Robi district (Table 1). A two–stage procedure was used to select the sample 
households. First, using lists of household heads in each site (generated for the 
purposes of this study), with the help of the local elders pastoral households were 
stratified into three groups: poor, medium income, and better–off. Thereafter, ten 
households were selected from each stratum using systematic random sampling 
technique. In most cases, household heads (usually male) were interviewed, 
though in a few cases responses were taken from an adult family member who was 
not the head. A group of trained enumerators conducted the interviews with  
 
10 
individual sample households, guided by a structured questionnaire prepared for 
this purpose.  
The overall data collection process encompassed two phases. The first phase 
(December 2004 to May 2005) involved several tasks, including implementation of 
the household survey, collection of secondary data, and collection of detailed 
qualitative data though group and key–informant interviews. The second phase 
(October 2006) was organized for a short period in order to strengthen the 
evidence gathered from the first phase by reviewing secondary sources and 
conducting expert interviews. 
4.  TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The clan is the lowest and de facto unit of traditional administration in Afar, 
although there are also smaller social units, such as the dahla or sub–clan. As 
Getachew notes, each clan comprises “a group of people related to each other by 
decent, living within shared territory and sharing common rituals and political 
leadership” (2001:54). Each clan has a well–established gerontocracy, whereby 
decision–making power regarding land and other natural resources resides within 
the clan council, consisting of the clan leader, elders, the feima,
2 and local wise 
men.  
Each clan manages its resources collectively, based on customary principles. 
Accordingly, herd management follows rotational grazing patterns. When rainfall is 
normal for successive seasons, clan members are instructed not to use reserved 
pasture areas. These areas are made accessible to the members only after other 
areas have been exhaustively used. Although each clan member has an inalienable 
use right over the resources, intra–clan customary laws (or operational rules) 
regulate these use rights.  
The traditional institutions of the Afar allow two types of resource users. The 
first category includes clan members who use the rangeland permanently. They are 
primary right–holders (waamo) who not only have the right to use the resources on 
the rangeland but also to exclude others and to transfer to their heirs. The second 
type of resource users comprises groups of neighboring pastoralists whose 
demands for pastoral resources go beyond their own endowments, particularly 
during drought years. These groups are secondary right–holders. They can be 
termed “right–holders” because they have frequent access to clan resources that is 
generally recognized and accepted by clan members and traditional leaders. 
However, certain obligations are operational on secondary right–holders in order to 
obtain access to the resources. Ex ante negotiation is required with waamo right–
holders, the success of which depends upon the relationship between the two 
groups and resource conditions. If they are allowed access, secondary right–holders 
are required to honor the customary rules of the host group. For instance, they 
should refrain from actions such as cutting trees, allowing other herders to use the 
resources, and rushing their livestock into reserved areas. 
 
                                                      
 
2 Feima is a rule–enforcing authority in Afar traditional administration. It consists of a principal 
leader (feima–abba), a deputy leader (erenna–abba), and ordinary members.  
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5.  COERCIVE WAYS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS CHANGE: THE STATE 
SUBVERTING THE COMMONS  
Triggers and Processes of Coercive Change 
 
The intervention of the state in Afar was very limited prior to the 1960s. Farming 
was limited to the lower Awash flood–fed plains, where some pastoralists in the 
Asahimarra section of Afar had been practicing mixed crop–livestock farming for 
generations (Getachew, 2001). However, following the 1960s state interventions in 
these areas have increased, mainly for two reasons. First, the Afar plains – 
specifically areas in the middle Awash valley – were found to have great potential 
for wide–scale irrigated farming. The most attractive feature of these areas was 
their suitability for cotton production, which was critically important for expanding 
the country’s textile industries: a primary focus of the first and the second five–
year national development plans (IGE, 1957; 1962). Second, pastoralism was not 
accepted as a livelihood strategy within the reigning national political mindset of the 
time. Rather, pastoralism was considered to be a primitive and nonviable way of life 
− to be avoided rather than preserved (Abdulahi, 2004; Getachew, 2001). Thus, 
the intention of the policy makers was to change this mobile mode of life towards 
sedentary farming. However, the pastoralists neither participated in the decision–
making process nor were they convinced about the goal of change. 
In 1962, the Awash Valley Authority (AVA) was established by decree as an 
agent of institutional change. AVA was responsible for undertaking several 
activities, such as the founding and management of state farms, coordination and 
financing of pastoral settlements and other schemes, and monitoring the overall 
transformation process, for which some 70,000 ha of dry–season rangeland was 
targeted (Getachew, 2001). AVA had direct military and financial support from the 
government to implement the planned changes, using its military power, for 
example, to threaten the pastoralists. The Middle Awash Agricultural Development 
Enterprise (MAADE) began operations on the expropriated rangeland with the main 
objective of satisfying the demand of domestic textile industries for cotton. Initially, 
it had an operating area of 300 ha, which was increased to 13,116 ha in 1985. In 
addition to MAADE, several pastoral development schemes were implemented with 
directives coming from AVA. These included collective settlement farms and 
irrigated pastures.
3 The costs to cultivate the settlement farms were covered by the 
state while the pastoralists contributed nothing except their labor. The output of the 
settlement farms was distributed among registered households.  
The implementation of the state–driven projects resulted in a mixture of 
property rights in the area. Firstly, by using its coercive power the state became 
the de facto owner of part of the land over which the pastoralists had had 
inalienable rights for generations. Secondly, the introduction of the collective 
                                                      
 
3 The irrigated pasture scheme was envisaged to plant a variety of improved grass seeds through 
the participation of the settler pastoralists, so that the latter would appreciate the improved 
techniques and thereafter manage the irrigated pasture independently. However, this did not take 
place, and the irrigated pastureland served the dairy farm that had been established to fulfill the milk 
consumption of the staff of the state farms.  
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settlement farms brought a new variant of common property, apart from the 
traditional communal ownership of the rangeland. Indeed, the non–riverine parts of 
the area remained under the control of the pastoralists and were entirely allocated 
for livestock grazing, whereas traditional rights were nullified by order from the 
state in the riverine sites. This implies that the intervention of the state created a 
“legal dualism”: claims over the riverine sites were governed and protected by 
statutory laws, whereas the non–riverine sites remained outside of direct state 
protection and legitimacy.  
Because the state, by the power vested in it, redefined the land use rules 
without consulting the pastoralists, the process of change was not smooth, with the 
pastoralists resisting every action of the state. Indeed, throughout the 1980s and 
1990s Afar pastoralists put great pressure on the administration of the state farms. 
4 The pastoralists expressed their dissatisfaction with and opposition to the 
implementation of the commercial farm schemes mainly by damaging mature crops 
in the field, a typical example being the recurrent damage caused by local people 
on banana plantations, which eventually forced the state farms to abandon banana 
production. Initially, the state farms allocated compensatory funds to be paid to 
clan leaders and elders in the form of employment benefits which would, it was 
hoped, ameliorate the dissatisfied pastoralists. This reward system did not put an 
end to the grievances, however, as the power of the pastoralists emanate from 
their great number, which was increasing over time.  
In the course of time, the relative power of the two actors has changed in 
favor of the pastoralists. At the beginning, AVA had the power of mobilizing 
resources to constrain the choices of the pastoralists and was capable of controlling 
their actions. However, it couldn’t maintain this power to continuously influence the 
choices and actions of its counterparts. This is partly attributable to the decline of 
attention paid by the government towards state farms after 1989. Especially after 
the economic reform of 1991, the stake of the state in business ventures 
dramatically declined. As a result, AVA did not receive enough financial, political, 
and other support from the government to maintain its power. In addition, the shift 
in the national political structure towards ethnic–based federalism and the 
concomitant establishment of the Afar National Regional State re–calibrated the 
power balance in favor of the pastoralists.  
These changes had effects on the existing property rights and land use 
arrangements. With the efforts of the Afar regional government and the decision of 
the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, MAADE handed over a significant part of 
its land, including irrigation infrastructure and facilities, to the Afar
5 in 1993. This, 
in turn, resulted in the existence of two distinct forms of property relations, 
consequently increasing the number of actors involved. First, the pastoralists 
subdivided part of the returned farmland and started private farming in 
collaboration with highlanders, implying the individualization of the traditional 
communal rangeland. Second, the pastoralists leased–out part of the returned land 
                                                      
 
4 The resistance was also supported by Afar Liberation Front (ALF), which declared armed struggle 
against the government on June 3, 1975, following the dramatic expansion of the commercial farms 
by the military government. (http://www.arhotabba.com/alf.html).  
5 The state farms handed over about 6547 ha, with the entire irrigation infrastructure intact 
(MAADE, unpublished document, 2005).  
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to local investors, whereby the latter annually transfer cash payments to the 
pastoralists,
6 implying the introduction of a lease contract regime into the area. 
In general, this sub–section shows that the state is the major source of 
property right changes in the middle Awash valley of Afar region. Empirical 
evidence from other areas in East Africa also confirms the significant role of the 
state with regard to property rights changes in pastoral areas. In some East African 
countries, such as Kenya and Uganda, the intervention of the state in forming 
modern ranches subverted traditional property rights arrangements and the 
existing ways of life (Fratkin, 1997; Mwangi, 2005; Rutten, 1992; Muhereza, 2001; 
Helland, 1977). Similarly, the pro–conservation policies of many East African 
governments resulted in the transfer of large areas of rangelands from pastoralists 
to the state (Fratkin, 1997; Markakis, 2004; Lane, 1998; Kisamba–Mugerwa, 
2001), as did the pro–farming policies that facilitated the rapid expansion of large–
scale commercial farms in pastoral areas of these countries (Rutten, 1992; 
Lesorogol, 2005; Shazali and Ahmed, 1999; Fratkin, 1997). None of these state–led 
transformations of traditional common property regimes were characterized by 
peaceful interaction between the state and the local people, and all took coercive 
lines. 
 
Impacts of coercive change on the livelihoods of pastoralists 
 
Direct intervention of the state has, step by step, changed the traditional property 
regime of the pastoralists and brought about new forms of land use arrangements 
that have direct implications for their livelihoods. Four distinct forms of land use 
arrangements have been implemented since the initial interventions of the state: 
state farms, settlement farms, individual small farms, and private large–scale 
farms. These new variants of property rights have one main feature in common: 
they are all related to the production of crops. However, each of them is unique in 
terms of the types of actors interacting with pastoralists and the impacts on rights 
and capabilities of pastoralists to secure livelihoods that they entail. The existence 
of state farms implies de facto state ownership as well as the nullification of 
customary rights, which pastoralists had had over land for generations. Indeed, the 
contemporary rights that pastoralists have over this portion of the former commons 
have been limited to use rights over crop residues, and only with the consent of 
officials from the state farms. On the other hand, the expropriation of large tracts 
of dry season rangeland, without compensation, has resulted in the reduction of the 
capability of pastoralists to secure livelihoods through the traditional means of 
livestock production. In this respect, the present vulnerability of Afar pastoralists to 
recurrent droughts is at least partly associated with such expropriatory measures of 
the state (Sen, 1981; Getachew, 2001; Yemane, 2003).  
The settlement farms, established for compensatory reasons, reflect a kind of 
interaction between the state and the pastoralists. In this case, the new resources 
                                                      
 
6 As realized from group discussions, investors pay 30 percent of their annual profit to pastoralists 
in the form of rent. In addition to financial payments to the pastoralists, the investors have promised 
to improve local infrastructure, including schools, watering trenches, and health stations. However, 




necessary to produce crops were entirely supplied by the state. The existing 
irrigation infrastructure and the road networks were built by the state through a 
large outlay. Similarly, farm machinery and facilities were purchased by the state. 
The technical personnel and the management staff had also been installed through 
the efforts of the state. While these resources defined capabilities to exercise rights 
within the parameters of the new land use system, pastoralists already had well–
recognized rights to the benefit streams from the land. In other words, they had 
the rights
7 as well as the capabilities to generate benefits from the settlement 
farms. However, the state was not “benevolent” forever, but rather stopped its 
support in the mid–1980s. The termination of state support and the concomitant 
transfer of all machinery and facilities to the state farms have debilitated the 
capability of the pastoralists to extract benefits from their land, although their 
rights to the land have remained intact. Lacking the knowledge and physical 
resources needed for farming, the pastoralists have not been able to continue crop 
production on the former settlement farms, despite their rights to do so. As a 
result, the entire settlement farm has been out of production and is covered, at 
present, by an inedible exotic weed (Prosopis juliflora). In fact, this part of the 
former rangeland is neither cultivated nor is it efficiently used for livestock 
production, which has direct implications for the livelihoods of the pastoralists. 
The return of the confiscated land in 1993 was an important action that 
reduced the influence of the state on the traditional lands of the pastoralists. 
Actually, the pastoralists were free to decide on what to do with the returned land. 
Accordingly, the land was partly allocated to clan members and was partly leased 
out to local investors. In regard to individual parcels of land, the Afar have 
established partnerships with agriculturalists from the highlands. Individual 
landowners have the right to choose their partners, define and redefine the land 
use contracts, and terminate contracts if required. In the lease arrangements, the 
new partners of the pastoralists are local investors. Under this form of contract, the 
pastoralists collectively earn 30 percent of the investors’ profits in return for the use 
of their land, which they distribute among themselves based on predefined criteria. 
They have formed a standing committee, including an accountant, to monitor all 
transactions of the investors. The committee has been entrusted to defend the 
rights of its principals and, hence, to take action when errors or other problems 
arise.  
While the current situation shows the restoration of the rights of the 
pastoralists over their traditional land, capability limitations are apparent in terms 
of maximally exploiting the new venture. First, pastoralists have poor knowledge of 
farming techniques and lack resources (such as farm implements) necessary to 
cultivate crops. As a result, the highlanders are responsible for all farm operations 
in return of larger shares of the net farm proceeds (up to 70 percent), whereas the 
contributions and earnings of the pastoralists are minimal. Actually, the share of 
the highlanders reflects the costs to be paid by the pastoralists due to their limited 
capabilities to produce crops on their own. Second, the capacity of the committee 
to actually carry out their responsibilities concerning the lease arrangements is 
                                                      
 
7 In fact, pastoralists were restricted to using the land consistent with formal regulations for the 
area. For instance, they couldn’t use it as rangeland.  
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questionable. The members have no accounting knowledge, and some of them do 
not even know how to read and write. Hence, everything is done based on trust, 
implying the possibility that the pastoralists could be cheated if the investors desire 
to do so. Again, this implies the weak position of the pastoralists under such 
arrangements. 
It is also worthwhile to pinpoint the distributional effects of the changes in 
property rights that have taken place. Traditional property rights allowed multitudes 
of users to share a resource system in accordance with certain predefined rules. 
Under the traditional arrangements, all clan members had equal rights to grazing 
resources and, hence, could extract benefits, provided that they had livestock. 
However, equality in rights to the communal heritage has not been ensured 
following the state–induced changes of property rights. During the initial period of 
the transformation, elites and their allies abandoned the customary rules and 
facilitated their own entitlement to the benefits from the settlement farms. Others 
used their physical fitness and connections with project leaders to secure their own 
benefits, while those households lacking such resources were denied access to them 
(Getachew, 2001). The procedures following the subdivision of the newly returned 
land has also not been immune to discrimination. Contrary to the traditional land 
law, about 31 percent of the sample households were left out of consideration 
during the subdivision. A closer look at the assets of the sample pastoralists chosen 
for this study shows that those who have not been benefiting from the subdivided 
land are poorer (average 0.89 TLU of per capita livestock asset) as compared to 
those who have been benefiting (2.91TLU). This inequity and mistreatment is even 
more visible with regard to the women. Female–headed households were neither 
considered when the returned land was distributed among clan members nor have 
they been beneficiaries from the leased–out land because of tradition–based 
criteria: women are de facto minors in Afar customary laws.
8 
6.  NON–COERCIVE WAYS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS CHANGES: VOLUNTARY 
ADOPTION OF FARMING 
Triggers of voluntary change 
 
Afar pastoralists in the study areas have been highly threatened not only by the 
coercive actions of the state, but also by recurrent droughts. Two major droughts 
have hit the areas since the mid–1990s, and short dry spells are common as well. 
The prevalence of drought has adversely affected the pastoral economy in two 
ways. First, it has reduced the total livestock assets and productive capacities of the 
area, thereby increasing mortality and morbidity rates. Sanford and Habtu (2000, 
cited in Mesfin 2003:44) have estimated that a 5 to 15 percent reduction in 
livestock assets occurred in Afar due to the drought of 1999–2000. In fact, this 
                                                      
 
8 Women have no ownership rights to land as well as other resources, including livestock. They 
hold conditional rights and, thus, are only entitled to benefit streams via their husbands. When a 
woman’s husband dies, all jointly owned assets, including livestock, are transferred to her husband’s 
family, and the widow loses control rights over ‘her’ former resources. As a small compensation, she 




estimation corresponds to the best–case scenario. Under the worst–case scenario, 
livestock loss has been estimated to range from 15 to 45 percent. Emergency 
assessment reports of various development organizations and relief agencies 
indicate that the prolonged drought of 20022003 had even more serious 
consequences for the Afar pastoralists (FEWS NET, 2002; UN–EUE, 2002a; UN–
EUE, 2002b).  
Second, the successive droughts have re–calibrated the terms of trade 
against the pastoralists. Although no systematic records have been found yet, 
assessment reports of aid agencies indicate a sharp decline of livestock prices 
during the droughts. A UN assessment mission in the area indicated that 
pastoralists faced more than 50 percent reduction in livestock prices following the 
drought of 1999–2000 (UN–EUE, 2000). Similarly, livestock prices fell by 50 to 60 
percent due to the drought of 2002, while maize prices simultaneously rose by 
about 235 percent (Davies and Bennett, 2007). The adverse effects of the droughts 
on the terms of trade were compounded by other factors, such as export 
restrictions imposed by Saudi Arabia in September 2000 following a Rift Valley 
fever outbreak and insecurity around the northern border of the Afar region in the 
aftermath of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998.  
These livestock losses coupled with the deteriorating terms of trade against 
pastoralists worsened food insecurity in the study areas, with the degree of food 
insecurity reaching its climax in 2002–2003 due to the intensified drought. A 
serious famine hit the area, during which a large number of pastoralists had 
nothing to eat. On 12 July 2002, the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 
Commission issued a Special Alert that publicized the deterioration of food security 
in several parts of the country, particularly in the Afar region and the neighboring 
East Shewa zone of Oromia. According to the Special Alert, 448,500 people in the 
Afar region needed emergency aid, out of which 45.3 percent were located in Zone 
3 (constituting Amibara and Awash–Fentale) and Zone 5 (constituting Semu–Robi).  
The deterioration of food security in pastoral areas in general and Afar in 
particular necessitated an intensified intervention of external agents (governmental 
and non–governmental organizations, NGOs) into pastoral livelihoods. While the 
most immediate external intervention was provision of food aid to save human 
lives, a number of programs and projects financed by the government and NGOs, 
such as FAO, Farm–Africa, CARE–Ethiopia, and Oxfam GB, were designed to 
improve the livelihoods of pastoralists. One intervention was focused on designing 
projects and programs to facilitate the expansion of crop cultivation in these areas. 
Both traditional authorities and external agents were important facilitators of 
collective action to begin farming. In this respect, external agents (local 
government and NGOs) sponsored meetings at the kebele level. While there exist 
no formal records of the number of local meetings in the study sites, the average 
number of meetings reported by the sample households ranges between 7.2 (for 
Dudub site) and 18.6 (for Daleti site) for the year preceding the survey. During the 
meetings, the external agents explained their vision and commitment toward 
improving the livelihoods of pastoralists, mainly through programs focused on 
farming. The interventions of the external actors were even more direct in three of 
the study sites, namely Harihamo, Daleti, and Doho. In Harihamo and Daleti, the 
government directly supported collective activities in relation to farming through its 
food security program. Assistance included provision of farm tools, covering initial  
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costs of farm operations (such as costs of tractor for tillage), provision of oxen, and 
other logistic and advisory support. At the Doho site, support was mainly provided 
by an FAO livestock recovery project office at Awash–Fentale, which provided 
financial support for initial development of irrigation infrastructure and farm inputs, 
mainly seeds. Moreover, district level experts on agriculture were responsible for 
providing advisory support to the “agro–pastoralists.”  
Similarly, the role of traditional authorities was substantial. Specifically, 
activities such as mobilizing clan members for meetings, organizing and supervising 
all activities such as bush clearing and land leveling, and imposing sanctions on free 
riders required the active participation of the feima members. Traditional sanctions 
were to be applied, including asset penalties, like slaughtering the breeding cows of 
free riders, and corporal punishment, such as beating free riders in public to shame 
them.  
The pastoralists were required to be involved in all activities to prepare the 
communal land for cultivation, following which it was allocated to the participants. 
The preparatory activities were done intermittently for about 4 months in Semu–
Robi and for 2 months in Awash–Fentale. For Amibara, the exact duration is not 
clear, but, according to sample respondents, it ranged between 30 and 180 days. 
The overall participation rates across districts in these cooperative activities were 
39.1 percent (n=70) with 13.3 percent (n=8) in Amibara, 23.3 percent (n=14) in 
Awash–Fentale, and 81.4 percent (n=48) in Semu–Robi. 
 
Analytical model and variables 
 
Section 6.1 indicates that farming is an enterprise that has been induced because of 
natural shock to the area. Understanding the movement of pastoralists towards 
farming entails comparison between the situation under farming and pastoralism. 
Thus, assuming that individuals make decisions by comparing their expected 
utilities associated with the two enterprises, this binary choice can be modeled 
following the utility function approach. Let Ui1 and Ui0 be the utilities of individual 
i associated with farming and pastoralism, respectively. We expected that 
community members would be heterogeneous in terms of the level of utilities 
generated from farming. We also expected that community members would vary in 
terms of the level of utilities they generate from pastoralism. Thus, Ui1 and Ui0 can 
be formulated as a function of other variables such that  1 1 1 1 i i i i i X U ε β α + + = and 
0 0 0 0 i i i i i X U ε β α + + = , where α and β are parameter estimates and X is a vector of 
exogenous variables that cause heterogeneity among community members. As a 
utility maximizer, individual i  decides in favor of farming if  0 0 1 > − i i U U , and 
otherwise if  0 0 1 < − i i U U .
9
 Accordingly, participation in collective activities to start 
farming reveals that  () ( ) i i i i i i i X 0 1 0 1 1 0 β β α α ε ε − + − < − . If we replace  1 0 i i ε ε −  by  i ε , 
                                                      
 
9 There could be indecision if  0 0 1 = − i i U U , but this happens with zero probability if 
0 1 i i U U − is a 
continuous random variable.   
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0 1 i i α α −  by  i α  and () i i i X 0 1 β β −  by  i iX β for brevity, then the probability that 
individual i  will participate in collective action to start farming can be specified 
as: () ( ) 1 1 X P C P i i i i β α ε + < = = . If a normal distribution function is assumed for  i ε , 
then the model turns out to be a probit model (Amemiya, 1981). Alternatively, if a 
logistic distribution is assumed, the model becomes the logit one (ibid). The two 
alternative models produce similar outputs, except in rare cases when the data 
concentrates around the tails of the distributions (Amemya, 1981; Greene, 2000). 
Here, the logit model is used since it lends itself to easier interpretation.  
Table 2 shows the description of the independent variables considered for 
logistic regression analysis and their hypothesized signs. The dependent variable 
takes on a value of 1 if a pastoralist participated in collective action to start 
farming, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables had been tested for their 
importance by using descriptive statistics before they were subjected to regression 
analysis. The results show that participants are significantly different from non–
participants with respect to all but one variable.
10  
 
                                                      
 
10 The exception was EDUCATE.  
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Table 2: Description of variables and working hypothesis 
Variable 
code (Xj) 
Description Mean  of  Xj or  
Percent of Xj = 1 
Hypothesis 
AGEHH  Age of household head in years  40.1  – 
EDUCATE  A dummy variable which takes on 1 if 
the household head is literate; and 0 
otherwise 
25.7 +/– 
ACTIVLB  The number of household members 




SUITAGR  A dummy variable which takes on 1 if 
the area is either suitable for rain–fed 
agriculture or can be irrigated given 
existing water resources and capacity to 
irrigate; and 0 otherwise.  
66.5 + 
PERCPLS  Per capita livestock holding of household 
(TLU) 
3.1 – 
EMPOPP  A dummy variable which takes on 1 if 
the household generates income from 
wage employment; and 0 otherwise.  
10.6 – 
SUPPORT  A dummy variable which takes on 1 if 
external agents provided direct support
12 
before and during collective activities; 
and 0 otherwise.  
49.7 + 
Source: Own survey data 
 
                                                      
 
11Classification was made based on local information. 
12 External support includes financial, material, and advisory services. Moreover, the role of 
external agents in organizing local meetings has been taken into account to define the variable.  
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Regression results and discussion 
 
The outputs of the regression are shown in Table 3. The signs of the coefficients in 
the regression are all in agreement with prior expectations. The chi–square statistic 
is significant, implying that the explanatory variables (taken together) are 
important in explaining the variability in the dependent variable (cooperation to 
start farming). The model was able to correctly predict 86 percent of the cases vis–
à–vis participation in collective activities. Since the standard coefficients in the 
logistic regression equation are not directly interpretable, the marginal effects of 
explanatory variables were computed by using an additional algorithm in the 
LIMDEP statistical software version 7.  
 
Table 3: Determinants of Cooperation among Pastoralists to Start Farming 
 Coefficients  SE  Marginal  Effects 
Constant   –3.6695**  1.2439  –0.6348 
AGE    –0.0143  0.01523  –0.0024 
EDUCATE   0.5477  0.5483  0.0947 
ACTIVLAB   0.0561  0.0776  0.0097 
SUITAGR   3.8085**  1.1561  0.6588 
PERCPLS   –0.1681**  0.0623  –0.0291 
EMPOPP   –2.0585*  0.8831  –0.3561 
SUPPORT 1.5636**  0.6195  0.2705 
Chi–square 108.7822** 
Log likelihood function  –65.39940 
Percent of correct prediction  86 
Number of cases  179 
Source: Own survey data 
* and ** significant at 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
Four variables are important for explaining cooperation of pastoralists in collective 
activities geared towards the decision to start farming: suitability of the area for 
agriculture, per capita livestock holding of a household, access to wage 
employment, and external support. Each of them will be discussed in some detail in 
the following. 
The proxy variable for suitability for farming (SUITAGR) is positively related 
to the level of cooperation. This variable is supposed to capture the variability 
among the study sites with respect to their potential for crop cultivation. In this 
respect, the study areas were classified into two groups, based on the perceptions  
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of the pastoralists. Ambash, Doho, Harihamo, and Daleti were classified as potential 
sites for agriculture, either because of the presence of irrigation infrastructure 
(Ambash and Doho) or because of better rainfall distribution (Harihamo and Daleti). 
On the contrary, Qurqura and Dudub were classified as non–potential areas. The 
heterogeneity of the study sites with respect to their potential for agriculture 
implies the existence of spatial variation regarding the costs of running a new 
enterprise (i.e. crop production). In areas where shifting to farming is easier, either 
because of better rainfall or the possibility of irrigation, mobilizing people for 
collective action is easier because people anticipate that they would incur relatively 
low costs in order to realize benefits that would be reasonably higher than the 
alternative engagements. The regression results indicate that the probability of 
cooperation in collectively organized action to start farming increases by about 66 
percent in areas where people perceive the possible benefits of farming. The 
perceptions of the pastoralists on the potential of their localities vis–à–vis farming 
influence their decisions because expectations about the benefits of cooperation 
arise from individual perceptions. 
The second influential factor is the level of wealth of pastoral households, as 
implied by per capita livestock ownership (PERCPLS). The expectation was that 
households with low livestock assets would have a relatively high incentive to go 
into cultivation as compared to their better–off counterparts for the simple reason 
that livestock are not dependable sources of livelihood for the former. This 
expectation holds true, as confirmed by the regression analysis results. More 
specifically, the probability that a household will cooperate in farm–preparing 
activities increases by about 2.9 percent for each total livestock unit (TLU
13) 
reduction in per capita livestock holding, implying that households with lower 
livestock assets are more likely to cooperate. In this regard, the variation among 
the pastoral households can be explained from a number of different perspectives.  
First, the possible differences in labor demands between those with low livestock 
assets (< 4.5 TLU
14) − hereafter considered as “poor households” − and those with 
larger livestock assets (> 4.5 TLU) − hereafter considered as “better–off 
households” − can be associated with differences in cooperative behavior between 
the two groups. Actually, the better–off households own significantly larger 
quantities of livestock (67.3 TLU) than poor households (11.2 TLU), whereas, in 
terms of active labor force potential, the former are in a slightly lower position (4.4 
persons) as compared to the latter (5.0 persons). Given the fact that those with 
larger livestock assets require more labor to properly manage their animals, the 
output reveals that labor is scarcer among households with better livestock assets. 
Thus, it can be deduced from the results that the introduction of crop production 
into the existing system would lead to greater pressure on better–off households in 
regards to labor allocation. When competition occurs between crop cultivation and 
livestock husbandry, it is less likely that better–off pastoralists would prefer to shift 
their labor to the “imported” enterprise (i.e. crop cultivation).  
                                                      
 
13 TLU refers to Tropical Livestock Unit. 1 Camel = 1 TLU; 1 cattle = 0.7 TLU; 1 donkey = 0.5 TLU; 
1 sheep = 0.1 TLU (ILCA 1992). 
14 In this region, 4.5 TLU per capita (or about 5 cows) is the minimum threshold level to sustain 
family members without requiring additional income from other sources (McPeak and Barrett, 2001).   
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Second, the decisions of the pastoralists concerning farming activities reflect 
their ways of reacting to natural hazards, mainly drought. Pastoralists exercise 
several traditional portfolio management techniques to mitigate risk. Livestock 
accumulation is one way to mitigate risk (Herren, 1991; McPeak and Barrett, 
2001). McPeak (2005) shows that a larger herd size pre–crisis implies a larger herd 
post–crisis. Diversification of livestock ownership is another ex ante risk 
management strategy, in which pastoralists adjust the composition of their 
livestock in a direction that could minimize asset loss due to disaster. Pastoral 
households also spread their livestock spatially throughout their personal networks 
to reduce risk.  
While these ex ante risk management strategies (although not exhaustive) 
may exist in many pastoral areas, the poor and better–off households do not have 
equal capability to exercise them. The poor appear to have lower capability to 
exercise any of the indicated options, simply because livestock are large 
investments to them. In this regard, the poor occupy lower positions, not only in 
terms of total amount of livestock, but also in terms of the diversity of these assets. 
A comparison made between the two groups vis–à–vis diversification (within 
pastoralism) shows that better–off households keep more livestock types (3.6 
species) than poor ones do (3.3 species). Moreover, better–off households own 
more camels (about 30 head) than poor households (about 3 head), which shows 
that the former are in a better position to withstand recurrent droughts.
15 Keeping 
livestock at different locations across personal networks seems to be a rational way 
of mitigating risks, especially those arising from localized, not region–wide shocks. 
This strategy is also less likely to be feasible for poor households, because there is 
not enough livestock to distribute spatially. 
Differences in ex–ante risk management strategies and capabilities between 
the poor and the better–off also affect their ex–post risk management strategies 
and capabilities to cope. In this respect, better–off households possess better 
resources to meet basic needs without resorting to other occupations, whereas poor 
households need to find opportunities outside of pastoralism to sustain their 
families. Therefore, the differences in cooperative behavior observed between the 
poor and better–off pastoralists with regard to farming are also attributable to their 
differences with respect to ex–post risk management strategies. 
Third, the difference observed between the two groups with regard to 
cooperative preparations to start farming can also be seen from the perspective of 
property rights. Common property regimes allow multitudes of users to share a 
resource system in accordance with certain predefined rules (Ostrom, 1990; 1992). 
Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that all rights–holders derive equal benefits from 
the resource system. Rather, benefits are a function of rights and capabilities of 
individual actors to utilize a resource system (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). A pastoralist 
who has limited financial ability to purchase additional stock obviously derives less 
benefit from the communal pasturage than his livestock–rich neighbor, given that 
the rate of livestock ownership is below the optimum. In other words, the former 
                                                      
 
15 Camels are best suited to arid areas like Afar. In times of water scarcity, they can endure 
without water for more than two weeks, while cattle need water at least once in three days. Moreover, 
camels feed on the foliage of trees and bushes, which are better in resisting drought than the grasses 
on which cattle are dependent.  
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exploits only a small portion of his rights as compared to the latter although, in 
principle, he has the right to derive as much benefit as his neighbor. Indeed, not 
only rights but also capabilities determine the actual benefit structure among a 
group of people. This is particularly apparent in common–pool resources, especially 
with this case in rangelands, where there is de facto open access for all group 
members.  
Capability differences among right holders to realize benefits from a 
communal resource system may result in differences in their reactions to new 
challenges or opportunities that may affect benefit streams. For the near–stockless 
Afar households, the incentive to cooperate in farming activities would be high, 
because in such a way they can better exercise their rights over the resource 
system. The current literature indicates that traditionally pastoral communities do 
provide opportunities for poor members with a little or no livestock to make grazing 
contracts with better–off community members or outsiders so that they can build 
their own herds (Ngaido, 1999). However, our evidence shows that, with regard to 
contractual arrangements, there is no special institutional treatment for poor 
households, implying that their only feasible available option for exercising rights is 
to take up crop production, provided that entry is made possible for them. 
Pastoral areas are generally marginal as far as intensive crop production goes. 
Consequently, livestock production appears to be the best and, in some areas, the 
only option under the existing technologies (Ahmed et al., 2002). However, as a 
result of challenges (mainly drought) which have caused rapid deterioration of 
pastoral livelihoods, these days pastoralists usually seek out alternative means of 
survival, at least on temporary basis. Since opportunities are lacking in most 
pastoral areas, resorting to agriculture is the main option that pastoralists pursue. 
Indeed, a growing trend toward crop cultivation is now observable in many pastoral 
areas of Ethiopia in general and Afar in particular (Yemane, 2003). In areas where 
alternatives are available, it is expected that pastoralists will make choices from the 
“bundle” of non–pastoral activities to sustain themselves, at least until the 
conditions for their main occupation improve. In such situations, alternative 
activities compete for pastoralists’ resources, and, hence, the decision to cooperate 
in farming activities is a matter of evaluating the existing opportunities from the 
perspective of each pastoral household, differentiated as they are in terms of 
existing assets and capabilities. In this vein, our results indicate that wage 
employment opportunities (EMPOPP) tend to have a negative influence on the 
decision to cooperate in farming activities. The probability of opting for cooperation 
declines by about 36 percent if a household earns income from wage employment.  
State farms are a major source of wage employment for pastoralists in the 
study areas, particularly in some locations of middle Awash valley. Although Afars 
are recruited only for lower level positions, those who get the chance do not 
hesitate to join state farms. All in all, about 11 percent of the sample pastoralists 
were employed in commercial farms. There are reasons why pastoralists prefer 
employment in state farms to farming by themselves. First, they can generate a 
more stable (and perhaps higher) income by being wage laborers, whereas farming 
is a risky business. Second, in most cases, pastoralists are employed as guards to  
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protect crops (mainly cotton) from livestock,
16 which is less tiresome than farm 
work and is preferable to pastoralists, who are quite used to tending animals.  
Finally, support from external actors (SUPPORT) has been found to be positively 
and significantly related to participation in collective action to start farming. The 
probability that a household will participate in collective action increases at the 
mean level by 27.1 percent in the presence of external support. There are two 
possible explanations for this result. First, participation of external actors in 
organizing meetings facilitates discussions and information exchange among 
pastoralists. Some pastoralists may not participate because they are completely 
unaware of the intervention. Some others may be ambivalent because of 
incomplete information with regard to the intended activities. Thus, the existence of 
external support increases the likelihood of participation of those households that 
either unwittingly or due to ambivalence fail to cooperate, thereby improving their 
awareness regarding what has been intended for their locality, the costs and 
benefits of cooperation and non–cooperation, the commitment of external 
supporters, the reactions of other members of the community, and the “rules of the 
game.”
17 
Second, financial and material support provided by external actors could 
increase the likelihood of participation. Such support, which augments the capacity 
of households to invest in the new venture, can particularly increase the 
participation of the poor, who may otherwise refrain from participation due to 
financial and material limitations. The positive effect of this variable is not, 
however, exclusively associated with poor households. Even the participation of 
better–off households can be enhanced in the presence of financial and material 
support as a result of possible reductions in costs of participation vis–à–vis the 
anticipated benefits. Moreover, better–off households may become persuaded to 
have their “share” from the resources externally injected into the system. 
7.  SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Traditional communal landholding has been prevalent in Afar, accommodating the 
interests of different user groups for many generations. This is attributable to the 
ecological conditions of Afar which entail the use of pastoral resources scattered 
over a wide area of land to produce livestock. However, this traditional land use 
system is changing because of pressures from both governmental policy and 
natural events. This study has examined both political and natural forces that have 
induced the transformation of the traditional land use arrangements in selected 
                                                      
 
16 Information obtained from MAADE indicates that there is great pressure coming from the 
surrounding areas to feed livestock on cotton stocks. While cotton harvesting normally comprises 
three rounds, pastoralists have been rushing their animals into the cotton fields immediately after 
first–round picking. In order to reduce this pressure from the local herders, guards are recruited from 
members of different clans. This is done to use social capital as a means of mitigating the problem. 
Quite large amount of money is allocated by MAADE to mitigate the problem. For instance, a total of 
294,335 Birr (~USD 34,000) was allocated in 2004–2005 for this purpose (personal communication 
with MAADE administrative officer).  
17 There is also a possibility that external agents may romanticize the outcomes of forthcoming 
cooperative efforts to persuade those who have not yet decided to join them.  
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areas of Afar. State intervention, which has been imposed mainly since the early 
1960s, brought about detrimental effects on the livelihoods of pastoralists. First, 
through employment of coercive ways, the state expropriated large areas of dry–
season rangeland, resulting in the exacerbation of feed scarcity in the area. 
Second, the state had been enforcing the transformation of pastoralism into 
sedentary farming without taking into account pastoral households’ capacities to 
produce crops. More specifically, the development schemes initiated and financed 
by the state couldn’t enhance the capabilities of pastoral households in a way that 
would enable them to derive full benefits from their land. Being devoid of public 
participation, these schemes paradoxically fostered a dependency syndrome among 
pastoralists, which remained even after their termination. Third, state intervention 
created a window of opportunity for some pastoralists, while others such as women 
and the poor were deprived of obtaining benefits from the new arrangements.  
When faced with challenges, pastoral households employ coping strategies 
which may involve different ways of using the available resources, even looking 
beyond pastoralism. The situation of recurrent drought, which was intensified in 
2002 and 2003, has imposed difficulties on pastoral livelihoods in Afar. On the one 
hand, the emergence of this natural challenge triggered the intervention of external 
actors to facilitate cooperation among pastoralists, providing a catalyst for the 
motivation of the pastoralists to take up farming. On the other hand, this natural 
challenge has increased the expectations of people that they will be able generate 
greater levels of utility by participating in such collective efforts, given the existence 
of external assistance. The expectations, whether realized or not, have produced 
cooperative decisions towards engaging in organized activities. However, individual 
households are heterogeneous in their capability to withstand the natural challenge. 
In case studied, our results show that poor households are more interested in 
farming and, hence, promote the transformation process. Whether this demand on 
the part of the poor could lead to permanent individualization of the previously 
communal land remains to be seen. 
Overall, the study indicates that communal land ownership, which forms the 
basis for pastoralism, is under pressure as a result of state intervention and natural 
challenges, as also depicted by several other studies in pastoral areas (Blench, 
2001; Markakis, 2004; Ensminger and Rutten, 1991; Helland, 2002). Though the 
same collective property rights might be shared, the individual capability of the 
right holder to utilize the resource varies to a great extent. This explains why the 
diversification into agriculture with the means of external intervention is more 
attractive to poor households with less livestock. Nevertheless, the transformation 
of the property rights regime is an effect of coercive and voluntary collective action.  
With regard to the present study, the following two points are worthy of policy 
attention: 
 
1.  Averting possible continuation of state coercion: The coercive expropriation 
of pastoral land has been slowed down since 1991, and Afar pastoralists have 
regained some of the lost rights over their traditional land. However, the 
current national policies are not immune from anti–pastoral ethos. For 
instance, the 2005 national land use proclamation declares the possibility 
that communal rural land holdings will be converted to private holdings if the 
government finds such transformation necessary (Article 5 No. 3). There is  
 
26 
also a clear plan to expand the existing irrigated land in the Awash basin 
(about 66 percent in Afar region) from 68,800 hectares to 151,400 hectares 
(Flintan and Tamirat, 2002). The implementation of such a plan would be 
impossible without evicting pastoralists, and the costs of eviction are usually 
underestimated. Moreover, it is usually assumed that simply providing 
financial compensation would be sufficient for those who lose their land. 
However, for pastoralists who do not have enough skills to engage in other 
occupations, providing financial compensation without further assistance is 
akin to facilitating their movement towards destitution. The failure of past 
‘compensation’ schemes in Afar (as discussed in this paper) indicates that 
investment expansion through compensation schemes may not lead to a 
situation in which all stakeholders benefit. Current experiences in non–
pastoral areas of the country also show that undervaluation of land, large 
variance between what investors pay and what evictees receive in 
compensation, and ultimate failure of evictees to start new livelihoods are 
critical problems associated with the expansion of investments in rural areas 
of Ethiopia (Bekure et al., 2006). These problems are attributable to the lack 
of effective institutions and appropriate governance structures, including (1) 
lack of clear guidelines on land valuation; (2) marginalization of landholders 
in the process of land transfers; and (3) a weak organizational setup to 
administer the transformation process. Indeed, such experiences provide 
good lessons that should be taken seriously in the national and regional 
policy arena before promoting investments in rural areas of Afar. 
 
2.   Harmonizing policy emphasis with the potentials of pastoral areas: The 
transformation of property rights due to natural challenges has had 
important implications for the livelihoods of pastoralists. In this regard, this 
paper has shown that the poor households (in terms of livestock assets) are 
more interested in farming as compared to the better–off ones. The decisions 
of pastoralists towards the commencement of farming activities could reflect 
their reactions towards recurring natural hazards: farming is considered as 
being a post–shock source of livelihood by those households that cannot call 
upon their pastoral assets in seasons following a drought period.  
Despite this fact, two points can be made about the potential of farming in the 
study areas in general. First, efforts to produce food crops under rain–fed 
conditions may not provide any substantial remedy to the decline of food security 
when drought occurs; during a prolonged spell it presumably will not. This is 
because crops are also biological products (like livestock) and, hence, can be 
negatively affected by drought. Livestock appear to be even somewhat more 
tolerant of drought conditions than crops, since they are mobile. The existence of 
mobile pastoralism in dry regions of the world also implies the relative viability of 
livestock production as compared to rain–fed agriculture in these regions. Second, 
although crops can be produced using irrigation in some ecological niches (for 
example, nearby major rivers); an irrigation–based production system is less 
appealing in many parts of Afar, given the scarcity of water. Consequently, 
livestock production appears to be the best, and in some areas the only, option 
under the existing technologies. The relatively low participation level of better–off 
pastoralists in collective action to start farming also implies that crop production is  
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not a substitute for, but rather is a subsidiary to, livestock production in such dry 
areas. Therefore, instead of overrating the sustainability and impact of farming on 
poverty reduction, it would be worthwhile to focus on livestock production (i.e. the 
core enterprise in pastoral areas). In this regard, improving key services, such as 
the livestock–market information system, veterinary and financial services; 
investing in infrastructure (roads and other facilities); and enhancing feed 
management are key to turning the silent transformation of the commons into a 
viable development path for the Afar. Livestock remains to be the best, if not the 
only, sustainable livelihood option under these ecological conditions. This implies 
the need for policies to introduce some form of drought insurance system, 
especially if cultivation remains transitory and generally not viable. The current 
investigations and experiments into livestock insurance schemes such as in 
northern Kenya (Orindi et al., 2007) are a promising new institutional mechanism 
to enable pastoralists to restock after drought and in order to save the value 
represented by male surplus animals in pastoral systems. 
The two cases of collective action in herding and farming are reactions to 
changing property rights. Diversification is an outcome of induced change, while the 
consequences of farming plots remain to be seen in the long run. Collective action 
plays a central role in managing the commons in Afar, as it also is an entry point in 
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